The Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labour and the Environment by Trebilcock, Michael
THE FAIR TRADE-FREE TRADE DEBATE: TRADE, 
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Michael J. Trebilcock*
The emerging international trade policy agenda is now focusing increasingly on 
what Dr. Sylvia Ostry has called “issues beyond the border”.1 With the dramatic 
decline in tariffs over the last four decades as a result of multilateral negotiations 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade2 and regional trade agreements 
like the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement* and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement * remaining sources of distortion in international trade are often 
claimed to be divergent domestic laws and policies that may constitute colourable 
forms of discrimination against foreign producers or at any rate may increase 
transaction and compliance costs, thereby inhibiting the full realization of 
economies of scale and scope in production and reducing the gains from 
international trade and foreign investment. Concerns over the economic effects 
of regulatory divergence have largely motivated harmonization efforts in the 
European Union, beginning with the Single European Act 198t9  and culminating 
in the Europe 1992 agenda. In the recently concluded Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations and under NAFTA, significant attention has been paid to: 
international trade in services and domestic regulatory impediments thereto; 
harmonization of domestic intellectual property laws; removal of domestic 
impediments to foreign investment; harmonization of product standards; and 
reduction of domestic preferences in government procurement regimes. In future 
multilateral and regional trade negotiations, attention is likely to be increasingly 
focused on regulatory divergences in environmental policies, labour standards, and 
competition policy. My lecture focuses principally on the implications for 
international trade policy of regulatory divergences in environmental and labour 
policies.
*Of the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto; director of the Law and Economics Programme. 
Synopsis of the Viscount Bennett Memorial Lecture, delivered at the Faculty of Law, University of 
New Brunswick (Fredericton) 3 November 1994. This synopsis is based on a longer paper in progress 
co-authored by myself and Professor Robert Howse of the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
1S. Ostry, “Beyond the Border The New International Policy Arena”, in Kantzenbach, Scharrer & 
Waverman, eds., Competition Policy in an Interdependent World (Baden-Baden: Nosmos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993) 261.
230 October 1947, Can. T.S. 1947 No. 27,55 U.N.T.S. 187, T.IA.S. No. 1700 [hereinafter GATT].
*22 December 1987, Can. T.S. 1989 No. 3, 27 I.L.M. 281. (Part A, Schedule to the Canada-United 
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While free traders have often been major proponents of harmonization efforts 
in many of the areas noted above, they commonly (and not obviously consistently) 
take the view that to condition a liberal international trading order on the 
adherence by states to minimum environmental and labour standards is either 
disguised protectionism, entailing an attack on the growth prospects of many less 
developed countries, or well-intentioned but economically illiterate intrusion by 
busybodies in the domestic affairs and political sovereignty of other countries. 
Some free traders see current fair trade claims as the most serious challenge to 
a liberal international trading order since the Great Depression. Fair traders, on 
the other hand, see free traders, with their near absolute commitment to an 
unconstrained liberal international trading order, as moral Philistines. The furore 
provoked by recent GATT panel decisions in the Tuna-Dolphin cases ruling 
G/47T-illegal a U.S. ban on tuna imports from countries in the Eastern Pacific 
that had failed to adopt similar regulatory policies to the U.S. to minimize 
destruction of dolphin widely reflect this view.6 Herds of dolphin often swim 
above schools of tuna, and fishermen have in the past adopted the practice of 
setting their purse seine nets for tuna on the dolphin, killing or injuring many in 
the process. The GATT panels held that the U.S. ban was an impermissible 
attempt to induce other countries (especially Mexico) to change their domestic 
regulatory policies where the sanctioning country’s own domestic environment was 
not threatened, violating Article XI of the GATT (which prohibits most 
quantitative restrictions on imports) and did not fall within the exceptions in 
Article XX(b) and (g) exempting measures necessary to protect human, animal 
and plant life or health, or measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources.7
I will argue that there is a germ of truth in both these polar positions in the 
fair trade-free trade debate, but that progress towards a coherent middle ground 
is only possible by rigorous disaggregation and analysis of what are in fact widely 
disparate fair trade claims. In particular, I will argue that in debates to date there 
has been a singular failure to distinguish between: (a) trade sanctions or 
restrictions designed to attain specific non-trade goals or to vindicate specific non­
trade values; and (b) trade sanctions or restrictions aimed at levelling the 
competitive playing field by neutralizing differences in regulatory compliance costs.
6U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1991), 30 I.L.M. 1594 (Tuna/Dolphin I); U.S. Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna (June 1994) DS 29/R (Tuna/Dolphin II).
7See generally, D. Esty, Greening the GATT (Washington, D.C: Institute for International Economics, 
1994); S. Walker, Environmental Protection Versus Trade Liberalization: Finding the Balance (Brussels: 
Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis, 1994).
I. Non-Trade Related Goals of Environmental and Labour Sanctions
In a range of contexts, citizens or governments in one country may be legitimately 
concerned with domestic policies or practices adopted in another. These cases 
include:
(a) Physical externalities where one country which shares a common air or 
water body with another country or countries permits trans-boundary 
pollution;
(b) The global environmental commons such as physical or biological systems 
that lie wholly or largely outside the jurisdiction of individual states but are 
valued resources for many members of society — as examples, the high 
seas, the electro-magnetic spectrum, the stratospheric ozone layer, the 
global climate system, and endangered species;
(c) Shared natural resources that extend into or across the jurisdictions of two 
or more states, such as oil reserves or stocks of fish;
(d) Universal human rights that are viewed as belonging to individuals 
regardless of their national affiliation, simply by virtue of their being 
human. Certain labour rights or standards have come to be widely 
regarded as basic human rights of a universal character, such as the right 
to collective bargaining and freedom of association; the right not to be 
enslaved; the abolition of child labour; and equality of opportunity in 
employment for men and women;
(e) International, political and economic spillovers, where extreme forms of 
human rights abuses and some labour practices such as violent suppression 
of workers’ rights to organize or associate (for instance the attempts to 
suppress the Solidarity movement in Poland) may lead to acute social 
conflict which gives rise to general political and economic instability that 
spills over national boundaries; and
(f) Altruistic or paternalistic concerns where citizens of one country may find 
purely domestic environmental or labour practices or policies of another 
country to be misguided or morally wrong, in that the welfare or rights of 
citizens in the second country are not felt to be adequately reflected in the 
domestic policies adopted in the second country because of 
unrepresentative, repressive, corrupt or incompetent forms of government.
In evaluating whether trade sanctions or restrictions may be an appropriate 
instrument for seeking to change objectionable domestic policies in another 
country, a number of issues seem relevant. First, one may wish to inquire, within 
a relatively conventional welfare economics framework, what the welfare
implications of such policies are likely to be. In many cases, a demonstration of 
substantial negative welfare effects from the invocation of trade sanctions, even in 
the service of non-trade related objectives, may count against recognition of such 
an option. Where such measures succeed in altering the targeted country’s 
policies, welfare may or may not be enhanced in the targeted country, depending 
on whether the policies previously pursued were socially optimal from that 
country’s perspective. As noted above, in a range of contexts there may be 
reasons for scepticism in assuming that existing domestic policies are always 
socially optimal. From a global welfare perspective, welfare may be enhanced if 
trade sanctions or restrictions compel the internalization of physical externalities, 
or promote political liberalization more generally by reducing human rights abuses 
or violent suppression of trade unions and perhaps as a result minimizing the 
regional or global spillovers from civil conflict or instability. In the sanction- 
imposing country, trade sanctions or restrictions are likely to cost consumers more 
as prices of imports increase and domestic producers price up to the higher import 
prices. Similarly, domestic producers may benefit if they have the lowest costs of 
any country complying with the desired standards. However, in many cases these 
price increases are likely to be small if some producers in the targeted country or 
producers in other foreign countries are able to meet the desired standards 
without significant increases in costs. Where sanctions fail to induce the adoption 
of higher standards in the targeted country, global welfare may still be enhanced 
if trade sanctions result in a reduction in the scale of the offending activities. 
Thus, without a detailed empirical analysis of the likely welfare effect of trade 
sanctions or restrictions adopted to promote these various non-trade related values 
or goals, it is impossible to make strong a priori claims about the scale of the 
welfare effects.
A second major issue to be considered in evaluating the appropriateness of the 
choice of trade sanctions or restrictions designed to induce changes in other 
countries’ domestic environmental or labour policies or practices is the likelihood 
of such sanctions in fact being successful. Here, it is important to adopt a 
comparative instrumental perspective by evaluating this response relative to other 
potential responses. These responses might range from doing nothing, registering 
diplomatic protests, severing diplomatic relations, promoting consumer labelling 
or boycotts, adopting a broader set of economic sanctions than trade restrictions 
alone (such as a total economic embargo), to the extreme of military intervention. 
In the most comprehensive empirical study of the efficacy of the economic 
sanctions (not involving labour or environmental issues) undertaken to date, 
Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott find that in 34% of 115 actions taken over a period 
of about 40 years the sanctions were largely successful in inducing the countries
targeted by them to change or modify domestic policies or practices.8 While this 
may be viewed as a discouraging success rate, one needs to ask whether a 
systematic policy of appeasement, acquiescence, or accommodation is always more 
appropriate, even in the face of grotesque human rights abuses in another country, 
or indeed whether a systematic policy of military intervention is likely to be more 
successful, given the mixed record of such interventions in countries such as 
Lebanon, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti and Vietnam.
A third major issue relates to the potential for corruptibility of such sanctions. 
Some free traders may concede that, in principle, trade restrictions or sanctions 
or broader economic sanctions may be justified, in some contexts, as a response 
to domestic environmental, labour, or human rights policies or practices pursued 
by other countries, but would nevertheless argue that as a matter of practical 
politics, the availability of trade policy instruments for these purposes is likely to 
pose significant risks of subversion in countries imposing such sanctions, by 
protectionist interests disguising their real motivation in ethical or related 
rationalizations. I believe that this concern is a legitimate one, and underscores 
the importance of distinguishing unilateral from multilateral actions in these 
contexts, given that international regimes are much less vulnerable to protectionist 
capture than purely domestic trade policy regimes. In making this distinction, 
some cases are easier than others.
First, some international treaties explicitly contemplate trade sanctions as the 
principal mechanism of enforcement. These treaties include the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species,9 the Basel Convention on the Control 
of Hazardous Wastes,10 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.11 Second, 
various international environmental or labour agreements (such as the ILO 
Conventions), while not providing explicitly for trade sanctions as a mechanism of 
enforcement, do provide for their own independent dispute resolution mechanisms 
to ensure objective determinations of violations. In reviewing challenges to trade 
sanctions invoked in response to alleged violations of these agreements, GATT 
dispute resolution panels might properly seek advisory opinions from these 
specialized dispute resolution mechanisms. Third, other international legal 
agreements or widely accepted international legal norms neither provide for trade 
sanctions as a mechanism of enforcement nor provide for specialized independent
8G. Hufbauer, J. Schott & K. Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2d 
ed. (Washington, D.C: Institute for International Economics, 1990); see also M. Miyagawa, Do 
Economic Sanctions Work? (New York: St. Martins, 1992).
^Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, 3 March 1973,12 
I.L.M. 1085.
x0Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal, 22 March 1989, 28 I.L.M. 656.
“ 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
dispute settlement bodies. In cases such as this, where trade sanctions have been 
invoked with a view to inducing other countries to change domestic policies that 
are alleged to be at variance with these international norms, and where these trade 
sanctions have been challenged before a GATT dispute resolution panel under 
Article XXIII of the GATT (or under similar procedures in regional trade 
agreements), it would seem imperative that panels apply a least trade restrictive 
means test. This would require the sanctioning country to demonstrate that no 
means less restrictive of trade was available to it, including attempts to negotiate 
a cooperative resolution to achieve compliance with these international legal 
norms. Fourth, where the standards or norms in question are sought to be 
unilaterally determined and enforced by the sanctioning country in the absence of 
any widely agreed international legal norms, in most cases GATT Panels might 
properly apply a very strong presumption that such sanctions are violations of a 
GATT member’s obligations.
II. Competitiveness-Based Arguments for Environmental or Labour Rights 
Related Trade Measures
Many fair trade claims view the effects of other countries’ environmental and 
labour policies on the welfare of domestic producers and workers as the principal 
concern, rather than the nature of the policies per se. These claims allege a form 
of unfair competition (unlike the first class of fair trade claim reviewed above). In 
these cases, domestic producer interests will be completely indifferent between 
inducing other countries to improve their standards (and raise their costs), and 
adopting protective trade measures to retain comparative advantage by neutralizing 
differences in regulatory compliance costs. In other words, these two outcomes 
are seen as perfect substitutes for one another. These claims, if accepted, have the 
potential to massively destabilize the international trading system, given that 
comparative advantage is pervasively influenced by different domestic policies in 
different states which, directly or indirectly, benefit or burden producer interests 
in different ways. Only complete global harmonization of most domestic policies 
could ever meet this objection — an inconceivable and highly undesirable prospect 
— rendering trade protectionism the default option in a wide range of cases.
Fair trade claims of this kind take two principal forms. First, it is said that it 
is unfair that our own firms and workers should have to bear the costs of higher 
domestic environmental and labour standards through loss of market share to 
other countries with less stringent standards. Second, it is said that it is unfair that 
downward pressure should be placed on our own environmental and labour 
standards by virtue of competition with countries of lower standards, thus setting 
in motion a “race to the bottom” dynamic. Applying the conventional prisoner’s 
dilemma framework, all countries may end up with the same share of international 
trade as they began with, but at the cost of adopting socially sub-optimal 
environmental and labour policies in the process of this destructive competition.
With respect to the first of these two fairness claims, the welfare effects are 
likely to be quite dramatic. Since every foreign producer whose environmental or 
labour rights compliance costs are less than those of domestic producers will be 
vulnerable to trade action, trade restrictions based on equalization of comparative 
advantage are likely to affect imports -  potentially very seriously -  from a wide 
range of countries, with corresponding negative price effects on consumers in the 
sanctioning country. However, it is not obvious that countries with higher 
standards need to relax these standards in order to remain competitive. In many 
cases, domestic policies designed to promote more efficient forms of regulation 
(incentive-based forms of environmental regulation rather than command-and- 
control forms of regulation), or policies designed to enhance the productivity of 
labour through job training or re-training initiatives may preserve the productivity 
differentials that explain prevailing patterns of comparative advantage. Moreover, 
as a matter of distributive justice, the case for shifting the costs of our more 
stringent standards onto workers in other, often poorer, countries, who do not 
even benefit from these standards, seems indefensible, especially where this 
reflects the failure of the sanctioning country to adopt superior domestic policy 
instruments to address environmental or adjustment issues.
With respect to the second competitive fairness claim (the “race to the 
bottom” claim), it is not clear that to preserve comparative advantage we will often 
need to relax our more stringent standards. In fact such differences in standards 
among countries have prevailed for decades, in many cases without undermining 
our comparative advantage. Even in cases where comparative advantage is 
increasingly threatened by divergences in regulatory standards, the appropriate 
solution to the prisoner’s dilemma problem is a cooperative rather than a non- 
cooperative one, with agreed constraints on selective regulatory competition, such 
as the prohibition under NAFTA of selective non-enforcement of domestic 
environmental and labour standards (the NAFTA Environment and Labour Side 
Agreements) or the selective relaxation of standards in order to attract or retain 
investment (Article 1114). However, it needs to be acknowledged that in 
promoting international cooperative solutions to these issues there is room for 
careful game theoretic research on the respective roles of “carrots” and “sticks” 
(including trade sanctions) in inducing agreement.
I have sought to emphasize the importance of disaggregating the various kinds 
of unfair trade claims if rigorous evaluation of their normative salience is to be 
undertaken. Once we have clarified what should count as a good or bad fair trade 
claim as a matter of principle, the positive challenge must then be confronted of 
designing institutional arrangements that can screen appropriately these two classes 
of claims. This enterprise will require minimizing to the greatest extent possible 
the scope for unilateral assertions of fair trade claims and maximizing to the 
greatest extent possible the role of international treaties, agreements and norms 
as the basis of such claims. Free traders, by indiscriminately dismissing all fair
trade claims and eliding the two major classes of such claims reviewed above, 
indeed run the risk of being discredited as moral Philistines with respect to non­
trade related fairness values and thus being marginalized in political debates, a 
prospect which entails serious risks for a liberal international trading order if 
credence is given to proponents of competitiveness-based fair trade claims.
